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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is from an order of declaratory summary judgment wherein the trial court
granted State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's ("State Farm") Motion for
Summary Judgment and denied Metropolitan Property & Casualty Liability Company's
("Metropolitan") Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court's order was entered on July
7, 1997, and contained therein a statement that the order was a final judgment pursuant
to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 524.)
This case has been transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme
Court.
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue number 1 listed in the "Statement of Issues" section of appellant's brief is dealt
with under points 8 and 9 below.
Issue number 2 listed by appellant in its Statement of Issues is dealt with under
points 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 below in appellee's brief.
Issue number 3 listed in appellant's brief is dealt with in points 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
below in appellee's brief, particularly in point 4 below.
Issue number 4 listed in appellant's brief is dealt by appellee State Farm in points
1,2, 3,4, and 5.
Issue number 5 listed in appellant's brief is dealt with in appellee State Farm's brief
below in points 1,2,3, 4, and 5.
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following statutes are determinative of this appeal.
1

Section 31A-22-302 states in pertinent part:
(1)
Every policy of insurance or combination of policies
purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security
requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall include:
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under
Sections 31A-22-303 and 31A-22-304;
Section 31A-22-303 states in pertinent part:
(1)
In addition to complying with the requirements of
Chapter 21 and Part II of Chapter 22, a policy of motor
vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(a)
shall:
(a)
name the motor vehicle owner or operator in
whose name the policy was purchased, state that
named insured's address, the coverage afforded, the
premium charged, the policy period, and the limits of
liability;
(b)
(i)
If it is an owner's policy,
designate by appropriate reference all
the motor vehicles on which coverage is
granted, insure the person named in the
policy, insure any other person using
any named motor vehicle with the
express or implied permission of the
named insured, and, except as provided
in Subsection (7), insure any person
included in Subsection (1)(c) against
loss from the liability imposed by law for
damages arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of these motor
vehicles within the United States and
Canada, subject to limits exclusive of
interest and costs, for each motor
vehicle, in amounts not less than the
minimum limits specified under Section
31A-22-304;or
(ii)
if it is an operator's policy, insure
the person named as insured against
loss from the liability imposed upon him
by law for damages arising out of the
insured's use of any motor vehicle not
owned by him, within the same territorial
limits and with the same limits of liability
2

as in an owner's policy under
Subsection (1)(b)(i); and
(c)
except as provided in Subsection (7), insure
persons related to the named insured by blood,
marriage, adoption, or guardianship who are
residents of the named insured's household, including
those who usually make their home in the same
household but temporarily live elsewhere, to the same
extent as the named insured.
IV. STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of Case,

This lawsuit arises out of an automobile accident which occurred on or about
October 23, 1991, at or near the intersection of 150 East Canyon Road and 2950 North,
Provo, Utah. The accident involved an automobile driven by Thor Y. Wixom and owned
by Laurie Yancey, and an automobile driven by Amy (Echard) Otto. (R. 1-2). At the time
of the accident, Thor Wixom was a resident of Douglas Wixom's household; on that date,
there was in force an automobile insurance policy issued by Metropolitan to Thor Wixom's
father, Douglas Wixom. (R. 222-25.) Also at the time of the accident, there was in force
a policy of insurance issued by State Farm to Amy (Echard) Otto's father, Robert A.
Echard, which extended insured motorist coverage and benefits to Amy (Echard) Otto. (R.
202.)
As a result of the accident, Amy (Echard) Otto initiated a lawsuit against Thor Y.
Wixom and State Farm. (R. 1-3.)

Amy (Echard) Otto alleged that Thor Wixom was

negligent. In addition, as to State Farm, Ms. Otto alleged that State Farm was obligated
to pay damages incurred by her under the uninsured motorist coverage section of the State
Farm policy based upon the allegation that Thor Wixom was uninsured at the time of the
accident. (R. 1-3.) State Farm's answer to plaintiffs first amended complaint contained
3

a third-party complaint against Metropolitan, wherein State Farm asserted that the
Metropolitan policy provided coverage for Thor Y. Wixom as it related to the subject
accident.

State Farm requested a declaratory judgment from the court against

Metropolitan declaring that the Metropolitan policy provides coverage, (including a duty to
defend and indemnify), for Thor Wixom, and that the uninsured motorist provisions of the
subject State Farm policy are not applicable based upon the fact that the subject
Metropolitan policy provides coverage. (R. 191-208.)
B.

The Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court.

As it relates to State Farm's Third-Party Complaint against Metropolitan,
Metropolitan filed a motion for summary judgment against State Farm, and State Farm filed
a cross motion for summary judgment against Metropolitan. (R. 321-384.)
On July 7, 1997, the trial court judge, the Honorable Michael Glassman, granted
State Farm's motion for summary judgment and denied Metropolitan's motion for summary
judgment. (R. 522-525.)
C.

Statement of Facts,

1.

On or about October 23,1991, at or near the intersection of 150 East Canyon

Road and 2950 North, Provo, Utah, an accident allegedly occurred involving an automobile
driven by Thor Y. Wixom and owned by Laurie Yancey, and an automobile driven by Amy
(Echard) Otto. (R. 1-2.)
2.

At the time of the accident, Thor Wixom was a resident of Douglas Wixom's

household; and on that date, there was in force an automobile insurance policy issued by
Metropolitan to Douglas Wixom. (R. 222-25.)
3.

Also at the time of the accident, there was in force a policy of insurance
4

issued to Amy (Echard) Otto's father, Robert A. Echard wl
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coverage and benefits to Amy (Echard) Otto, pursuant to the terms of the policy. (R. 202.)
4.

As a result of the accident, A m y (Fr;hriir«11 Otfi i iiiilMteil .1 il n '

Y. Wixom and State F a r 5.

»r

'^

>

11 Hi ml 11

. i nOijIiLjbnt,
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n, as to

State Farm, she alleged that State Farm was obligated to pay d a m a g e s incurred by plaintiff
unrli M il I in * ni mi nisi II i Il iniiMiti nil1,!
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ol Hie State Harm policy based upon the allegation

that Thor Wixom was uninsured at the time of the accident. (R. 1-3.)
6.

State Farm's answer to plaintiffs first a m e n d e d complaint contained a third-

party complaint against Metropolitan wherein State r a n n c — - v
policy provided coverage for Thor Y, W i x o m as it related to the subject accident, State
Farm requested a declaratory judgment fro
the Metropolitan policy provide coverage, (including a duty to defend and indemnify,) for
Thor Wixom, and that thf
are not applicable based upon the fact that subject Metropolitan policy provides coverage.
(P

i m

°08 |
In Metropolitan's answer to State Farm's third-party complaint, Metropolitan

riumil ih.it

III

MIHII

i II inli in ipoliidii pom y ibsueu iu uouglas Wixom provides coverage

"pursuant to the requirements of the Utah Code relating to 11 lotor vehicle insurance." (R.
206,222-25.)
8.

In Metropolitan's answer, Metropolitan alleges if i its third affirmative dr-tfpnsp

that:
Metropolitan alleges that there is n r no 'oivicif > i mi in U ir ils [; ilicv
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for Thor Wixom's use of the vehicle owned by Laura Yancey
because it was a non-owned vehicle available for his regular
use.
(R. 224.)
9.

In Metropolitan's answer they do not assert that there is no coverage under

the policy based upon the definition of a relative. (R. 222-27.)
10.

Thor Wixom testified in his deposition that on the date of the accident, he was

living with his family at his father, Douglas Wixom's, residence. (R. 376.)
11.

Thor Wixom had been residing at that residence for "[approximately two

years." (R. 377.)
12.

At the time of the accident, Thor Wixom was driving a vehicle owned by

Laura Yancey. (R. 378.)
13.

At the time of the accident, Thor Wixom had permission to drive Laura

Yancey's car. (R. 378.)
14.

Normally, Laura Yancey would drive her car, including driving her car to and

from BYU, where she was attending school. (R. 379.)
15.

Thor Wixom had asked Laura Yancey to borrow her car on the date of the

accident to run some errands. He had dropped her off at school previously that day and
was on his way to pick Laura Yancey up at BYU at the time of the accident. (R. 378.)
16.

Thor Wixom testified in his deposition that Laura Yancey normally drove her

vehicle, including "to school and what not." (R. 380.)
17.

Thor Wixom owned his own vehicle at the time of the accident, but was not

driving it because he was trying to sell it; he allowed the insurance to lapse about two
weeks prior to the accident, "so I wasn't driving my own car." (R. 380-81.)
6

18.
:t

Thor Wixom, who was engaged to Laurie Yancey at the time, tpstifipi I ih, it

*i\/ used Yancey's vehicle for his own personal purposes one "or maybe two times"

"for short periods of time/' and that he did r tot \ ie-o ft> /nhk.k' "^n n rp' n ilai hnsis" stntinn:.
Q:'

A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

A:
Q:

A
~

A.
n

'

(BY MR. Echard) On this particular day - let's go back
before that. You indicated you had been insured until
approximately two weeks before the date of the
accident.
To my recollection, yes.
So I gather, then, you had driven your car as long as
you had insurance on it.
Yes.
So it was not necessary to drive your girlfriend Laura's
vehicle up until at least two weeks before the accident.
Correct.
Do I understand you did not drive it on a regular basis,
even from the time your insurance lapsed until the time
of the accident?
Correct.
Would you have an estimate of how many times you
may have driven it from the time your insurance lapsed
until the date of the accident, the approximate two week
period of time?
I would probably say in that period of time I drove it
maybe seven times for short periods of time.
And would she be with you on occasions?
;<r
the time we would go places together, !
f
would drive and she would drive.
I'm sorry?
About half the time I would titw
time she would drive.
Most of those seven times, woulu she --ave oeef

you?

M.

I \Aost of them, yes.
So you two would go somewnere Together a date or
whatever, part of those times vou v;uld drive the
vehicle because you were wi1,; l '^r rn ner /ehicie or 'h?/:
occasion?
„orrect.
But you did not use it for your owi i personal purposes
during those two weeks except for ti lis occasion?
Where there any others?
Yes, 1 did use the car. Well, nqam it ,is four y^ars
7

Q:
A:

Q:
A:

ago.
I understand.
All I can say is the chances are, ves. I did use it another
time or maybe two times during that two week period of
time.
But not on a regular basis?
Correct.

(R. 329-30, 384-85, 389-91, 406.) (Underlining added.)
19.

On January 24,1997, Metropolitan filed a motion for summary judgment and

supporting memorandum, wherein Metropolitan argued the following basis of noncoverage: "The undisputed material facts conclusively show that Metropolitan does not
have a duty to defend and/or identify Thor Wixom for the claim of Amy (Echard) Otto
because she is not a 'relative' of Douglas Wixom for coverage under the Metropolitan
policy." No other basis of non-coverage was asserted by Metropolitan in its motion for
summary judgment. (R. 340-55.)
20.

On January 28, 1997, State Farm filed "Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment against Metropolitan," requesting an Order "declaring that the policy of insurance
issued by Metropolitan provides coverage, including a duty to defend and indemnify Thor
Wixom, as it relates to this matter and declaring that the uninsured motorist provisions of
the subject State Farm policy are not applicable based upon the fact that the Metropolitan
policy provides coverage." (R. 21-23.) In the memoranda filed by State Farm relating to
these motions, State Farm argued, among other things, following points:
(1)

The Metropolitan policy provides coverage pursuant to Utah statutory law,

and any policy provisions in conflict with Utah law are invalid;
(2)

Even assuming Utah statutory law did not invalidate the "regular use"

exclusion, (which it does), the vehicle was not available for regular use;
8

(3)

Metropolitan waived any right to argue ir

e

on the "regular" use issue;
(4)

The "regular use"

(5)

Even assuming that Utah statutory law did not otherwise make the language

relatin(

.

-.

ave

waived its right to assert that argument; and
(6)

P

n ni i I! mi in! ni ni i i HL uoTiniuuii i if r e l a t i v e is a m b i g u o u s .

(R. 321-39, 388-99, 4 5 8 - * )
21.

C

> hearing was held on Metropolitan's motion for summary

judgment, and State Farm's motion for summary judgment. (R. 510 11 )
22.

On a number of different occasions, counsel for Metropolitan admitted to the

court during the'hearing on the motion tni .imiiii in, |iiiiiiiiiii|i

in iiiii i ini

Douglas Wixom, would have been covered under the Metropolitan policy had Douglas
Wixorn hf^>• > '• • , | 1 1 < i'"

,| |ni

•^

,|

"'MI/ 1 *-

^nhir^

HI

inm in iip » ii ifn

11"i idyi 11 i ii ( u d 11u"" ' ' . i • om

been the named insured. (T ranscript on Appeal, pp. 10 -1 1, attached to Appellant's Brief
as -

JSS'IOI

MR. DAVENPORT:

i took place at the hearing:

. . . Undep the Metropolitan policy, it
* 'oi «Id have provided coverage for
Douglas Wixom had Douglas Wixom
been operating Laura [Yancey's] vehicle
You don't dispute that?
MR. ERICSON:
A re you saying he had several vehicles
under the policy, but had another one that
was not MR. DAVENPORT: He owned it. It wasn't insured, just sittir »g
tf iere, an antique.
MR. ERICSON:
i es
THE COURT:
So if he drove or [SIC] an antique vehicle,
there would be coverage.
1

MR. ERICSON:
THE COURT:

Apparently.
I understand.

(Transcript on Appeal p. 27, attached to Appellant's Brief as Addendum "1".)
23.

As another example, as it relates to a hypothetical where Douglas Wixom

was driving the girlfriend Laurie Yancey's vehicle, the following statements were made
during the hearing:
THE COURT:

MR. ERICSON:
THE COURT:
MR. ERICSON:
THE COURT:
MR. ERICSON:

THE COURT:
MR. ERICSON:
THE COURT:
MR. ERICSON:
THE COURT:
MR. ERICSON:
THE COURT:
MR. ERICSON:
THE COURT:
MR. ERICSON:

Let's say he never had it, and he is
driving the girlfriend's vehicle.
Uh-huh.
First of all let's take the State law. You
agree our State law would mandate the
insurance involved here cover him?
Yes, to the extent that-well, the policy is
written so that it would extend to him.
The policy in fact does. I am asking do
you agree the State law would require it?
It would not require it. It would allow it to
be put in the policy if it is an owner's
policy. Now if it is an operator's policy,
then the State law would require it.
. . . We have an owner, and the owner
has a policy that covers the vehicle he
listed.
Correct.
And that owner one day has a friend who
asks him to drive her car?
Correct.
Because she is sick.
Correct.
He is driving her car. Doesn't know it is
not insured. Gets in an accident.
Correct.
I would assume that his owner's policy
would cover him driving that non-owned
vehicle.
As a practical matter, yes. . . .

(Transcript on Appeal, pp. 10-12, attached to Appellant's Brief as Addendum "1".)
24.

At the end of the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the trial court

10

judge expressly stated that it granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment and
-opolitan

|

r summary judgment for the reasons set forth by State

Farm. Moreover, the court instructed counsel for State Farm

3

Order was based upon the reasons argued by State r ~ ~
(Transcript on Appeal, p. 3 I .ittnchfrl ti 1 *A| 11 >i HI, ii M > ni if-i 1 ^ A 1 1 < h 1 i< In 1111 II 1
25.

After State Farm's counsel prepared a proposed order as instructed by the

Judge, a copy nf si if h was

SPIII

I

I I I I V I IMI

M'!li"|vlit,in

I Jfjli'ipdilaii did

M.

11 object

to the form/language of the proposed order prepared fay State Farm on the basis that the

52(a), Utah Civil Procedure," (as Metropolitan argues in its brief).
26.

C

1.

IT IS HEREBY ORPFR^n ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
defendant ~
Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company's Motion iur Summary Judgment against
Metropolitan is hereby granted for the reasons set forth in
State Farm's Memorandum in Support of State Farm's Motion
for Summary Judgment Against Metropolitan and Reply
Memorandum in Support of State Farm's Motion for Summary
Judgment Against Metropolitan. Among other things, in
granting defendant State Farm's Motion for Summary
Judgment Against Metropolitan, this court declares that the
ifaject Metropolitan policy provides coverage for Thor Wixom
as it relates to this matter, and that the uninsured motorist
provisions of the subject State Farm policy are not applicable
based upon the fact that the Metropolitan policy provides
coverage.
IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that Metropolitan's Motion for Summary Judgment
is hereby denied based upon the reasons set forth in State
Farm's Memorandum in Opposition to Metropolitan's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
Finally, pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, this court finds that there is no just reason for delay
and expressly directs that this Order be, and the same hereby

2

3.

lurt entered the following order:

11

is, a final judgment.
(R. 523-24.)
27. On or about July 7, 1997, Metropolitan did file a "Request for Clarification on
Ruling on Summary Judgment," asserting that:
It was not clear to Metropolitan if the court's ruling expressly
contemplated the 'regular use' exclusion issue raised by the
parties. Metropolitan therefore requests a clarification from the
court regarding whether or not that issue was intended to be
resolved by the court's order on the motions. If it was resolved
by the court as argued by State Farm, Metropolitan would not
have any objection to State Farm's proposed order.
(R. 518-20.)
28. In "State Farm's Opposition to Metropolitan's Request for Clarification on Ruling
on Summary Judgment," State Farm pointed out that all the issues before the court were
taken into consideration and ruled upon. As indicated above, the trial court expressly
stated, among other things, that it granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment and
denied Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment based upon State Farm's arguments.
Moreover, the court expressly instructed the counsel for State Farm to put in the Order that
the court's ruling was based upon all of State Farm's arguments. (Transcript of Appeal p.
31, attached to Appellant's Brief as Addendum "1".)
Further, the "regular use" language was expressly dealt with not only in the
memoranda but also in oral argument. (See e.g. Transcript on Appeal, pp. 28-31, attached
to Appellant's Brief as Addendum "1".) Metropolitan's counsel, Carl Ericson, specifically
refers to the exclusionary language relating to "relative" (see e.g. Transcript on Appeal pp.
6-7) and the "regular use" exclusion (see e.g. Transcript on Appeal pp. 28-29). Mr.
Ericson, states among other things: "First of all, on the regular use thing . . . ." (Transcript
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on Appeal p. 28.)
In Metropolitan's docketing statement, Metropolitan only lists four "Issues Presented
by the Appeal."

The

o

statements two through five of the statement of issues in Appellant's brie:, iiowever, the
lirst h> .1 IP in Mntif )\

il mi i

I M % i il .11 n H 1 1

preserved (for appeal) in its docketing

statement. The first issue set forth in Metropolitan's brief is as follows: "Did the trial judge
( nn nil ip,<«p,i(i|(> n

1 1,1 in, 1 ! cig to issue a brief statement of the grounds for its decision

as required by Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."
y

SUMMARY

OF ARGUMENT

1. Utah statutory law requires coverage*~ " * "

""'-•

t

Metropolitan can insure a resident relative to a lesser exie^ than a namea insured under
its policy. ThorWixomw"

•'-"•'^ -

been the named insured under the policy, he would have been covered However, section
31A-22-302 pMirPss.lv rnnml iln1- Hi ml ip'-iricnt nilative-i in iiisuietJ ki llie same extent as
the named insured,
2

IL

I

I herefore, the Metropolitan policy provides coverage.

I

I . nl 'i li ml I I

language which states that

'•-> .-.

illiinivjiJ based 1 ipon the Metropolitan policy
- ^ - *•

Mnfropi i\\Ui\ it 11 n iilif v language >. v ^
with Utah iuA /

*

effect.

„..

Kjlicy

langilage.

Here, the

.^ates u,^\ ; its policy language is inconsistent

Since the exclusionai y language relied 1

,.w, there is coverage on this basis alone.
_. The Metropolitan policy language is at the very least ambiguot is basfnl 11|

II

language referring to the statute. If Thor Wixom read the policy language stating that the
statute governed as to coveraqp .mid then
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resident relative is insured to the same extent as the named insured, Thor Wixom would
believe he was insured under the circumstances. At the very least such creates an
ambiguity as to coverage. Since ambiguities are construed in favor of coverage, the
Metropolitan policy provides coverage on this basis also.
4. The vehicle was not available for the "regular use" of Thor Wixom. The vehicle
was owned by Laurie Yancey; and she used it ever single day. It was in her possession
nearly the entire time, including the days when she attending B.Y.U.

Laurie Yancey

merely allowed Thor Wixom to use it on one or maybe two times for personal errands for
short periods of time. Thus, Yancey's car was clearly not available for Thor Wixom's
"regular" use.
5. The "regular use" language in the policy is ambiguous. In fact, the Utah Court
of Appeals has actually already addressed this same policy language in the Metropolitan
policy. In the declaratory action Metropolitan Property and Liability Insurance Company,
v. Finlavsan. 751 P.2d 254 (Utah App. 1988), this Court found that the terms "regular use"
in the Metropolitan policy were ambiguous, therefore there was coverage.
6.

Metropolitan has waived any right to rely on the "relative" (who owns an

automobile) exclusionary language. Metropolitan did not timely assert or argue this policy
language, and has therefore waived any right to appropriately assert such on appeal as
a basis for non-coverage.
7. Metropolitan did not appeal the trial court's ruling that Metropolitan waived its
right to rely on the "relative" exclusionary language. Therefore, this court should affirm the
trial court on that separate basis.
8. Metropolitan has waived any right to challenge the language of the Order
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I dnn ^ motion and denying Metropolitan's motion

h Metropolitan did not

timely object to the form of the proposed order; in fact, Metropolitan, in essence, ; i| -| w\ w M
its form.
9. The trial court's order was otherwise ;i[i|in prinh

III irnln .11*-*s lh,il ill r. based

upon all the reasons argued by State Farm, Moreover,, even if the order did not state its

ARGUMENT
=? <VGE BY ME i RO POLiTAN.
In Appellant's brief, Metropolitan asserts that the Metropolitan policy is only an
"HWI

,L .h

ti

However, it is irrelevant whether the Metropolitan policy is only an

"owner's policy" or both "an owner's" and an "operators policy" because Metropolitan is
required to provide coverage pursuant to statute even if its policy is only an owners
policy."
Before discussing the particular statutory requirements, a review of a number of
general
requirements as to coverage under an automobile insurance policy. Utah law allows an
ir

*,-

Ann. § 31A-22-303(2)(b) ('?

i I 'b luquift J by statute. See Utah Code

• owever, an insurer cannot provide less coverage than
oee e.g. chambers v. Agency Rental Car, Inc., 878 P 2d

1164, 1167 (Utah App. 1994). To the extent a policy provision contravenes the statutory
H-quih

lenlL, Hull (jNiii||i;y piuvision has no effect in excluding coverage. See e.g. id.
In addition, insurance contracts are liberally construed in favor of coverage. See

e.g. Metropolitan Property and Liab. Ins. Co. v. Finlaysan. 751 P.2d 256, 257. Ambiguities

15

in an insurance contract will be strictly construed against the insurer. See e.g. kL Further,
when an insurer claims there is no coverage pursuant to an exclusion, the insurer has the
burden of proof in showing non-coverage.
Metropolitan admits that its policy must provide the coverage mandated by Utah law.
For example, in Metropolitan's counsel's oral arguments on the motions for summary
judgment, he states:
Now for the purposes of this motion, we really don't dispute that Thor was
living at his parents' house at the time of the accident. And as such, he
would be considered a resident of their household. Also for the purposes of
the motion, we have no dispute that insurance companies are required to
provide whatever statutory coverage is mandated by law.
(Transcript on Appeal p. 3, attached to Appellant's Brief as Addendum "1".) In addition,
Metropolitan admits that Section 31A-22-303 of the Utah Code sets forth what is required
in an "owner's policy." (See Transcript on Appeal pp. 4-5, attached to Appellant's Brief as
Addendum "1".)
Turning to the actual statutory language involved, Section 31A-22-302 states in
part:
(1)
Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to
satisfy the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301
shall include:
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under Sections 31A-22-303
and31A-22-304;

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302 (1992). Section 31A-22-303 states in part:
(1)
In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21 and Part
II of Chapter 22, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection
31 A-22-302(1)(a) shall:
(a)
name the motor vehicle owner or operator in whose
name the policy was purchased, state that named insured's
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address, the coverage afforded, the premium charged, the
policy period, and the limits of liability;
(b)
(i)
If it is an owner's policy, designate by
appropriate reference all the motor vehicles on
which coverage is granted, insure the person
named in the policy, insure any other person
using any named motor vehicle with the express
or implied permission of the named insured, and,
except as provided in Subsection (7), insure any
person included in Subsection (1)(c) against loss
from the liability imposed by law for damages
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or
use of these motor vehicles within the United
States and Canada, subject to limits exclusive of
interest and costs, for each motor vehicle, in
amounts not less than the minimum limits
specified under Section 31A-22-304; or
(ii)
if it is an operator's policy, insure the
person named as insured against loss from the
liability imposed upon him by law for damages
arising out of the insured's use of any motor
vehicle not owned by him, within the same
territorial limits and with the same limits of liability
as in an owner's policy under Subsection
(1)(b)(i);and
(c)
except as provided in Subsection (7), insure persons
related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or
guardianship who are residents of the named insured's
household, including those who usually make their home in the
same household but temporarily live elsewhere, to the same
extent as the named insured.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303 (1988) (emphasis added).
Thus, as it relates to an "owner's policy," the statute states that the policy "shall",
"insure the person named in the policy

" Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(b)(i) (1988).

The person named in the Metropolitan policy is Douglas Wixom. In addition, (and as
admitted by Metropolitan), subsection (1)(c) of this statute has an additional requirement
relating to an owner's policy; (this additional requirement is also required in an operator's
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policy). Subsection (1)(c) of 31A-22-303 states that the owner's policy shall " insure
persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, . . . who are residents of the
named insured's household,. . . to the same extent as the named insured." Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-22-303(1)(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
Thus, the statute requires that Metropolitan insure resident relatives of the named
insured "to the same extent as the named insured." Here the named insured is Douglas
Wixom. Moreover, (as the facts clearly show and as Metropolitan has already admitted),
Thor Wixom is related to the named insured by blood (and marriage), and was a resident
of the named insured's (Douglas Wixom) household. Therefore, pursuant to the statute,
the Metropolitan policy has to insure Thor Wixom "to the same extent as the named
insured [Douglas Wixom]/'
It is clear that had Thor Wixom been the named insured (and therefore had the
same coverage as the named insured), there would have been coverage for Thor Wixom
under the circumstances of this case. As set forth in the statement of facts, Metropolitan
admitted at the hearing and in memoranda that had Thor Wixom had the same coverage
as his father and named insured, Douglas Wixom, Thor Wixom would have been covered
by the metropolitan policy. Metropolitan's position is that Metropolitan does not have to
provide the same coverage under its policy for a resident relative [Thor Wixom] as it does
for the named insured [Douglas Wixom]. However, that position is directly contrary to the
statutory language. As Metropolitan has already admitted, language in the Metropolitan
policy that is in conflict with Utah statutory language is of no effect.
The Metropolitan policy itself expressly states, among other things, that:
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We will pay damages for bodily injury and property damage
to others for which the law holds an insured responsible
because of an occurrence which results from the . . . use of
. . . a non-owned automobile. We will defend the insured, at
our expense with attorneys of our choice, against any suit or
claim seeking these damages.
(R. 360.)

The policy goes on to state that "insured" means:
(b) with respect to a non-owned automobile:
i.
You; or
ii.
Any relative
(R. 368.)
The policy goes on to define "you" as: "'You' and ' y ° u r ' mean the person or
persons named in the declarations of this policy as named insured and the spouse of such
person or persons if a resident of the same household." (R. 369.)
As the policy indicates, the named insured is "Douglas Wixom". (R. 369.) It is
important to point out that the definition of "you" does not include any person or the spouse
of any person who owns a private passenger automobile.

(R. 369.)

However, the

definition of "relative" states: "relative means a person related to you by blood, marriage
or adoption and who also resides in your household... . Relatives does not include any
person or spouse of any person who owns a private passenger automobile."
(R. 368.)
Hence, under the Metropolitan policy, there is coverage for "you", (which is defined
as the named insured), with respect to liability arising out of the use of an non-owned
vehicle. Thus, named insured Douglas Wixom, (under the express language of the
Metropolitan policy), would have been covered had Douglas Wixom been driving Laurie
Yancey's vehicle, (instead of his son Thor Wixom). If Thor Wixom had the same coverage
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as his named insured father Douglas Wixom, Thor Wixom would be covered by the
Metropolitan policy. There is no exclusionary policy language which applies to the named
insured - Douglas Wixom. The exclusionary language relied upon by Metropolitan only
relates to "relatives," which does not (by definition) include the named insured. However,
as discussed above, the Utah statutory language relating to "owners" policies requires that
the Metropolitan policy "insure persons related to a named insured by blood or marriage
. . . who are residents of the named insured's household . . . to the same extent of the
named insured." Utah Code § 31A-22-303(1)(c) (1988) (emphasis added). Here, Douglas
Wixom would have been insured under the Metropolitan policy if he was driving the Yancey
vehicle. Likewise, if Thor Wixom was the named insured, he would have been covered
under the policy language. Accordingly, pursuant to statute, the policy is required to
provide coverage to Thor Wixom since the statute requires the resident relative to be
insured to the same extent as the named insured.
(Note, this argument was made by counsel for State Farm both in State Farm's
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, (see e.g. R. 465-66), and
during the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, (see e.g. Transcript on Appeal,
pp. 27-28).)
Not only do we have the Utah statutory law for authority supporting coverage of Thor
Wixom, there is also Utah case law supporting coverage under the circumstances of this
case. See Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah App. 1988). In Barber,
(particularly the footnotes relating thereto), the court addressed the effect that the prior
amendments to Section 31A-22-303 had on coverage, and the fact that the current
statutory language requires that "all family members have exactly the same coverage
20

under automobile policies written in this state." Jd, at 253 n.5 (emphasis added). In
discussing a window of non-coverage in the prior statutory scheme, the Barber court states
in footnote four:
4. That such a 'window' was permitted to exist is shown by recent legislation
designed to close all such windows. Section 31A-22-303 of the new
insurance code provides that all automobile policies issued in this state shall,
inter alia:
[l]nsure persons related to the named insured by blood,
marriage, adoption, or guardianship who are residents of the
named insured's household, including those who usually make
their home in the same household but temporarily live
elsewhere, to the same extent as the named insured.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(1)(c) (1986) (emphasis added).
i d at 253 n. 4 (underlining added; italics in original). Note, the Barber court emphasized
by using italics the language in subsection 31A-22-303(1)(c) which states: "to the same
extent as the named insured" The Barber court then went on to indicate in footnote five
the following:
5. Had Frank been driving the uninsured motorcycle, or even an uninsured,
electric bus, he would have been entitled to coverage despite the policy's
effort to exclude motorcycles and electric busses. This is so because, as he
was named as insured, the SRA's provision that liability coverage extend to
him when driving uninsured vehicles, including motorcycles and electric
busses, would take precedence. The same is true for Mrs. Barber, who, as
the insured's spouse, was defined under the policy as a named insured. Had
Mario borrowed an uninsured car and driven it, rather than a motorcycle, into
Mr. Bernards' car, he also would have been covered. This is so because the
policy, although not required by the SRA to do so, protected Mario while
driving uninsured automobiles, as opposed to vehicles of other sorts. The
silliness of the statutory regime in effect when this accident occurred shows
the Legislature's wisdom in now requiring that all family members have
exactly the same coverage under automobile policies written in this state.
See Note 4, supra.
id. n. 5 (underlining added.).
As the Barber court indicates in footnote five, the current statutory scheme requires
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"that all family members have exactly the same coverage under automobile policies written
in this state." id. (underlining added). Thus, Section 31A-22-303 requires that Thor
Wixom have exactly the same coverage as named insured Douglas Wixom under the
Metropolitan policy. The Metropolitan policy, as Metropolitan admits, would have provided
coverage for Douglas Wixom, under the circumstances. Therefore, even assuming that
the Metropolitan policy is an "owner's policy" (as asserted by Metropolitan), the
Metropolitan policy still has to provide Thor Wixom coverage under the circumstances of
this case.
As indicated above, it is irrelevant as to whether the Metropolitan policy is a "owner's
policy," or both an "owner's policy" and an "operator's policy." There is coverage for Thor
Wixom under either case. If the Metropolitan policy is an "operator's policy", it has to
provide coverage for Thor Wixom under the circumstances of this case; in fact,
Metropolitan has admitted this fact. (See e.g. R. 430.) As Metropolitan admits, an
"operator's policy" requires coverage for the named insured "arising out of the insured's
use of any motor vehicle not owned by him," and subsection (1)(c) requires that the
resident relative [Thor Wixom] be covered "to the same extent as the named insured [Thor
Wixom]". Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(1)(1998). Thus, if the Metropolitan policy was an
"operator's policy", Douglas Wixom would be covered for liability arising out of his use of
any motor vehicle not owned by him, as would his resident relative Thor Wixom.
Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the Metropolitan policy is solely an "owner's policy", or
an "owner's" and "operator's" policy, since in either case coverage is required for Thor
Wixom.
In Metropolitan's brief, it cites Bain v. Gleason. 726 P.2d 1153, 1157-58 (Mont.
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1986). However, the part of the Bain decision cited by Metropolitan only deals with the
policy language, and does not deal with Utah statutory requirements. \±

Bain is a

Montana case. Bain does not address the Utah statute set forth above, or any similar
statutes as it relates to this issue. \±

Accordingly, Bain is completely irrelevant.

In its brief, Metropolitan also cites language from Grange Ins. Ass'n v. MacKenzie.
694 P.2d 1087 (Wash. 1985), relating to the purpose of such a provision. However,
Grange is not on point, and does not deal with any statutory language, let alone Utah
statutory language. (Moreover, it is ironic that Metropolitan cites this case because the
language relating to the purpose of the exclusion (and the case in general) supports a
finding of coverage under the Metropolitan policy.) In any event, it is the Utah statutory
and case law cited above that governs.
Finally, Metropoltan cites Dairyland Ins. v. State Farm Auto. Ins.. 882 P.2d 1143
(Utah 1994); however, that case obviously deals with a completely different situation, and
nothing in Dairyland supports in any way a reversal of the trial court's order.
2.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BASED UPON
THE METROPOLITAN POLICY LANGUAGE WHICH STATES THAT UTAH
LAW GOVERNS OVER ITS OWN POLICY LANGUAGE.

As pointed out in State Farm's memoranda, the subject Metropolitan policy states:
CONFORMITY WITH FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS
If we certify this policy under any financial responsibility law,
this liability coverage will comply to the extent of the liability
coverage . . . required by law. . . .
(R. 334, 362, 396-97, 467.)
Thus, the Metropolitan policy itself indicates that it will provide coverage as required
by the Utah Financial Responsibility laws, despite any provisions in its policy to the
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contrary. As discussed in point one above, the Metropolitan policy provisions relating to
non-coverage do not conform to the financial responsibility laws of Utah and are of no
effect. Hence, the Metropolitan policy must be read to provide coverage for Thor Wixom.
Accordingly, the trial court's order should be affirmed on this basis also.
3.

THE METROPOLITAN POLICY LANGUAGE, INCLUDING LANGUAGE
RELATING TO CONFORMANCE TO UTAH LAW, IS AT THE VERY
LEAST AMBIGUOUS.

It is State Farm's position that the statutory law is clear and requires coverage under
the circumstances of this case. The statutory required coverage is dispositive. However,
the policy language itself is at the very least ambiguous.

As discussed above, all

ambiguities are construed in favor of coverage, and against the insurer. As quoted above,
the iVfetropofitan poficy expressfy indicates that it compfies with Utah faw as to liability
coverage. (R. 362.)
A resident relative [Thor Wixom] who reads the Metropolitan policy section quoted
above on "Conformity With Financial Responsibility Laws," then reads Section 31A-22-303,
(including the part which states that the resident relative is insured to the same extent as
the named insured), and then reviews the policy and sees that the named insured [Douglas
Wixom] is covered for the use of Laurie Yancey's vehicle under the circumstances of this
case, would be lead to believe that he would be covered. Thus, at the very least, the policy
itself is ambiguous as to whether or not Thor Wixom would have coverage to the same
extent as the named insured, Douglas Wixom, (and coverage under the circumstances of
this case). Because all ambiguities are construed in favor of coverage, Thor Wixom is
covered on this basis. Hence, the trial court's order should be affirmed.
As a further separate basis, when all of the policy provisions are reviewed under the
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Metropolitan policy, the Metropolitan policy language is otherwise ambiguous therefore
mandating coverage.
4.

THE VEHICLE WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR THE "REGULAR USE" OF
THOR WIXOM.

As set forth above, insurance policy provisions are strictly construed against the
insurer. See e.g. Finlayson. 751 P.2d at 256. The interpretation of insurance contracts
"requires liberal construction in favor o f coverage. \± Further, the insurer has the burden
of proving the exclusion of any language is applicable.
In its answer, Metropolitan asserts that: "There is no coverage under its policy for
Thor Wixom's use of the vehicle owned by Laurie Yancey because it was a non-owned
vehicle available for his regular use."

(R. 224).

The policy defines a non-owned

automobile as an automobile which is not "made available for regular use." (R. 368.)
As already discussed above, this policy provision is directly inconsistent with Utah
statutory law and has no effect. However, as State Farm agrued in its memoranda, even
assuming that this policy exclusion is not contrary to Utah law, (which it is), this exclusion
does not exclude coverage under the circumstances of this case because the subject
vehicle was not available for "regular use" to Thor Wixom. (R. 334-37, 467-69.)
This is supported by the definition of "regular" found in Webster's New World
Dictionary Third Edition (1980), which states that "regular" means "for general, unrestricted
use." Here, the vehicle was not available for Thor Wixom's general, unrestricted use. The
statement of facts set forth above show that the vehicle was owned by Laurie Yancey. In
order to drive Yancey's car, Thor Wixom had to first obtain permission from Laurie Yancey;
Laurie Yancey drove the vehicle on a daily and routine basis, including driving it to and
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from BYU where she was attending school; Laurie Yancey normally drove her car on all
occasions, including "to school and what not;" on the particular day of the accident, Thor
Wixom asked Laurie Yancey for permission to use the vehicle that day to run some
errands; Thor Wixom dropped Laurie Yancey off at school previously that day and was on
his way to pick up Laurie Yancey at BYU at the time of the accident; Laurie Yancey and
Thor Wixom were engaged at the time and would go on dates; during these dates
sometimes Laurie Yancey would drive her car, and sometimes she would give permission
to Thor Wixom to drive her car; the total number of times that Thor Wixom had driven the
car was "maybe seven times" "for short periods of times;" as it relates to those seven times,
only once or "maybe two times" had he driven the vehicle for his own purposes, and then
it was only for "short periods of time;" and Thor Wixom "did not drive it on a regular basis."
(R. 1-2, 378, 379, 380, 384-85.) Thus, this was Laurie Yancey's car, and she used it ever
single day. She had it in her possession nearly the entire time, including the days when
which she was attending school. Laurie Yancey merely allowed Thor Wixom to use it on
one or maybe two times for personal errands for short periods of time. Thus, Yancey's car
was clearly not available for Thor Wixom's "regular" use.
Other cases support a finding that the vehicle was not available for "regular use."
For example, a similar issue was addressed in Knack v. Phillips. 479 N.E. 2d 1191 (Illinois
Ct. App. 1985), wherein the court states:
Plaintiff basically contends that the term "regular use"
applies a broad degree of discretion given to the driver, and if
the discretion is restricted or limited, as plaintiff argues in the
case here, the automobile is not available for regular use.
Such restricted or limited use, plaintiff asserts, is present here,
where Pamela is required to return the vehicle to Dominik
Bombeck on the weekends and, in fact, was returning the
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vehicle at the time of the accident, and her use during the
week was for the main purpose of driving her car to and from
work....
We believe the availability of the Bombeck vehicle on
the facts here are more consistent with a limited and casual
use and not a regular use as characterized by the permission
to use for all purposes and for a more definite period of time .

]£L at 1192-94.
Accordingly, the trial court's order should be affirmed on this separate basis.
In Metropolitan's brief, it argues under issue number "3" that the trial court
incorrectly ruled "that there were no disputed issues of fact on the issue of whether the
non-owned automobile driven by Defendant Wixom at the time of the accident was
available for his regular use." First, it is disingenuous for Metropolitan to claim that there
is a dispute as to a material fact relating hereto when Metropolitan filed its motion for
summary judgment first, and cited the same facts (as undisputed facts) in support of its
motion for summary judgment. (See R. 350.)

In the section entitled "Statement of

Undisputed Material Facts" in Metropolitan's "Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment", Metropolitan cites from the same pages of Thor Wixom's deposition
and expressly set forth statements relating to Thor Wixom's use of the vehicle, including
the following statements: "Wixom was 19 years of age and residing with his parents;"
"Yancey owned her own vehicle, a 1972 Ford LTD;" "in the two weeks between the lapse
of insurance and the accident, he drove Yancey's vehicle approximately seven times;"
"Yancey would have been with him during most of those seven instances in which Wixom
drove Yancey's car;" "Wixom also used the vehicle for his own personal purposes on a few
occasions during the two-week period;" "Wixom had permission to drive Yancey's car at
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the time of the accident;" and "on the day of the accident, Wixom had dropped Yancey off
at BYU, and then used her car for some errands, he was on his way back to pick up
Yancey at BYU when the accident occurred." (R. 347-50.) These are verbatim quotes set
forth by Metropolitan in its section of undisputed facts in its motion for summary judgment.
Thus, Metropolitan asserted prior to the court's ruling that such facts were undisputed;
now, after the court has ruled against Metropolitan, it is now asserting that these
statements of fact are disputed, (although Metropolitan does not state how they are
disputed). In summary, Metropolitan has admitted these facts, and its current assertions
are, at the very least, disingenuous.
Moreover, in State Farm's reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary
judgment, State Farm addressed an assertion by Metropolitan in its opposing
memorandum that they "should have the opportunity to conduct its own discovery before
summary judgment is determined on this issue." In response to such, State Farm argued:
In Metropolitan's opposing memorandum they also indicate that they
"should have the opportunity to conduct its own discovery on the issue
before summary judgment is determined on this issue." Such an assertion
by the counsel for Metropolitan is disingenuous. First, Metropolitan has filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter, which indicates that
Metropolitan itself felt that it had conducted all of the necessary discovery.
In addition, defense counsel mailed Metropolitan's counsel, Carl Ericson, a
copy of the deposition of Thor Wixom on September 25, 1996. Had Mr.
Ericson desired to further depose Mr. Wixom, Mr. Ericson could have done
so during the four month period thereafter prior to the time that Metropolitan
filed its motion for summary judgment. In addition, counsel for Metropolitan
knew all along that State Farm would be filing a motion for summary
judgment relating to these issues; in fact, this counsel has had many
discussions with Mr. Ericson relating to this defendant's and Mr. Ericson's
positions as to coverage. Finally, Metropolitan has not filed a Rule 56(f)
motion along with the appropriate affidavit that "he cannot for reasons stated
present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition." See Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(f). Accordingly, plaintiffs counsel has waived any right to a
continuance of this court's ruling on State Farm's Motion for Summary
Judgment. In any event, because the statutory language requires coverage
under the circumstances and makes the exclusionary language relied upon
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by Metropolitan of no effect, it is irrelevant and no continuance should be
granted (even if a motion for such had been appropriately made).
(R. 469.)
In summary, Metropolitan's assertion that there are material facts in dispute is
meritless for the following reasons: (1) there are no disputed facts relating hereto; (2)
Metropolitan already asserted that these same facts were undisputed in its memorandum
in support of its motion for summary judgment, and therefore have admitted such; (3)
Metropolitan never filed a Rule 56(f) motion seeking additional time to gather other
evidence in an attempt to show a dispute of fact; (4) Metropolitan has not brought forth any
evidence showing a dispute of fact; and (5) even if there was a disputed fact, which there
is not, Utah statutory law mandates coverage in any event and makes this exclusion of no
effect.
Accordingly, the trial court's order should be affirmed on these additional bases.
5.

THE "REGULAR USE" LANGUAGE IN THE METROPOLITAN POLICY IS
AMBIGUOUS.
Whether a policy is ambiguous is clearly a question of law. See e.g. Finlaysan. 751

P.2d at 257-58. It is not a question of fact, i d In addition, once an ambiguity is found, it
must "be construed in favor of coverage." id. at 258.
As State Farm argued in its memoranda, the use of the terms "regular use" in this
Metropolitan policy is ambiguous, requiring the extension of coverage. (R. 334-337, 46769.) In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals has actually already addressed this same policy
language in the Metropolitan policy. In Finlaysan. 751 P.2d 254; which was a declaratory
action, the court found that the terms "regular use" in the Metropolitan policy were
ambiguous, and that therefore there was coverage. In concluding, the Finlavsan court
states:
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As previously stated, if the words used to express the meaning
and intention of the parties may be understood to reach two or
more plausible meanings, the language is ambiguous. We find
either construction presented by the parties plausible. Each
interpretation has some supporting case law, and are ordinary
uses. For all that has been said, we find inescapable the
conclusion that the phrase "regular use," as used in the
Metropolitan policy, is ambiguous. The phrase must therefore
be construed in favor of coverage for Newall Finlaysan and,
therefore, recovery for appellant Childs.
i d at 259.1 Thus, this Court should find coverage because of the ambiguity, and affirm the
trial court's decision.
Although it is irrelevant, in Metropolitan's brief, Metropolitan makes the meritless
assertion that the two definitions for "regular use" set forth in Finlaysan are met under the
circumstances of the case. However, although there would be coverage regardless,
neither definition is met in this matter. One definition was referred to as a "pattern of
usage" and defined it as "use which is consistent with a pattern or prescribed course of
conduct or dealing." i d at 255. The other definition referred to "frequency or use," and
defined it as frequent and continuous use, emphasizing the fact that the user had actual
control over the vehicle (always). JdL at 256. Obviously neither definition is met in this
case.
In Appellant's brief, it cites Progressive N.W. Insurance v. Hoverter. 829 P.2d 783
(Wash. App. 1992). However, Hoverter does not support there position, and is easily
distinguished. Among other things, in Hoverter the people had their father's vehicle in their

1

Note, the Utah Finlaysan court opinion cited above was vacated because, (after a petition for
re-hearing had been filed and granted), the parties entered into a settlement. Finlaysan, 751 P.2d
437.
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exclusive possession and could use it at any time without asking anyone permission.
Moreover, there is already Utah law on point dealing with the actual Metropolitan language.
6.

METROPOLITAN WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO RELY ON THE
EXCLUSIONARY LANGUAGE THAT "RELATIVE DOES NOT INCLUDE
PERSONS" "WHO OWN A PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTOMOBILE."

As discussed above, the Metropolitan policy indicates that there is coverage for
"relatives" who drive non-owned automobiles. However, the definition of relative in the
Metropolitan policy states in part: "Relative does not include any person . . . who owns a
private passenger automobile." (R. 368.)
We have discussed above in Point 1 that this exclusionary language is directly
contrary to the Utah statutory requirements. Because the statute governs, this policy
language is of no effect, and there is coverage under the Metropolitan policy.
Under Point 2, we also pointed out that there is a provision in the Metropolitan policy
which states that Metropolitan certifies that its policy complies with state financial
responsibility laws, and to the extent it has language that does not comply, it is of no
effect. When the statute is incorporated into and made a part of the policy (pursuant to the
policy language referring to the statute), the policy is at the very least ambiguous.
Moreover, the policy language is otherwise ambiguitous.
Each of those bases in point 1 and 2, in and of themselves, support an affirmance
of the trial court's order.
As a separate basis, State Farm argues under this point that Metropolitan has
waived its right to rely on this exclusionary language under the circumstances; (this
argument was made by State Farm in its memoranda). (R. 337-38, 397-98, 468-69.)
In Metropolitan's answer, they do not assert that this policy language relating to the
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ownership of an automobile excludes coverage for Thor Wixom. Moreover, during the
many years in which Metropolitan knew of this case, and was contacted about coverage,
they had never taken the position that there was no coverage based upon this language.
After both Metropolitan and State Farm had filed their motions for summary
judgment, Metropolitan filed a motion to amend its answer to the third-party complaint to
assert a defense based upon this language relating to the ownership of an automobile by
Thor Wixom. (R. 436-444). However, as the record on appeal demonstrates, that motion
was never granted, (and was untimely in any event).
State Farm points out in its Memorandum in Opposition to Metropolitan's Motion to
Amend Answer to Third-Party Complaint, Metropolitan was put on notice of the fact that
Thor Wixom may have owned a car at the time of the accident long before Metropolitan
filed its answer. (R. 453-56.)

Further, Metropolitan's counsel was sent a copy of Thor

Wixom's deposition, (wherein Thor Wixom pointed out that he owned another vehicle),
many months before either party filed their motions for summary judgment. (R. 453-56.)
Under the circumstances, Metropolitan has waived its right to assert this policy
language as a defense to coverage under the policy. On this separate basis State Farm
requests that the court affirm the trial court's order.
7.

METROPOLITAN DID NOT APPEAL THE COURT'S FINDING THAT
METROPOLITAN WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO RELY ON THE "RELATIVE"
EXCLUSIONARY LANGUAGE.

State Farm argued to the trial court in its memoranda that Metropolitan had waived
its right to rely on the "relative' exclusionary language (that there is no coverage for a
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relative "who owns a private passenger automobile"). (See R. 337-38, 397-98, 468-69.)
The trial court found in State Farm's favor on all grounds argued by State Farm including
this point. Metropolitan has not appealed the trial court's finding that Metropolitan waived
its right to rely on this 'relative" exclusionary language because Metropolitan has not
appealed the trial court's finding on this issue and because the court's finding of this issue
is sufficient to uphold the court's order relating thereto, this court should affirm the trial
court's order on this separate basis alone.
8.

METROPOLITAN HAS WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE
LANGUAGE AND CONTENT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER.

The first issue listed in Metropolitan's brief under its "Statement of Issues" is: "Did
the trial judge commit reversible error by failing to issue a brief statement of the grounds
for its decision as required by Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Metropolitan has
waived its right to raise this argument because: (1) it did not appropriately raise this issue
at the trial court level; and (2) it did not raise this issue in its docketing statement. Either
one of these two failures is sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute waiver of Metropolitan's
right to appeal this issue.
At the end of the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the trial court
expressly stated that it was denying Metropolitan's motion and granting State Farm's
motion based upon all the reasons asserted by State Farm. State Farm was instructed
to prepare the order.
Counsel for State Farm prepared an appropriate order, and sent a copy of such to
Metropolitan's counsel on July 1,1997. Pursuant to the rule 4-504(1) of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration, objections to proposed orders "shall be submitted to the court and
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counsel within five days after service." See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-504(1).

Here,

Metropolitan did not file an "objection" to the form of the proposed order, and therefore
waived any right to object to its form.
In addition, Metropolitan did not bring a Rule 52(b) motion requesting that the court
amend its judgment, and has thereby waived its right to do so on this separate basis.
Utah courts have long held that an appellant's failure to file a Rule 52(b) motion precludes
the appellant's right to raise the issue on appeal; In Alford v. The Utah League of Cities
and Towns. 791 P.2d 201 (Utah App. 1990) the Utah Court of Appeals addressed this
issue.:
Initially, Alford argues the trial court erred by failing to issue a brief
written statement of the grounds for granting the League's motion for
summary judgment because alternate grounds were argued by the League.
See Utah R. Civ. F. 52(a) We agree that under rule 52(a) the trial court is
required to make a brief written statement delineating which alternative
theory it accepted in granting summary judgment. However, Alford failed to
object or move the trial court to correct this oversight under Utah R. Civ. P.
52(b). Failure to object below, in order to give a trial court an opportunity to
cure the problem, precludes us from considering the error on appeal.
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 944 (Utah 1987) ("matters not raised at the
trial court level will not be considered by [appellate court] on appeal,
particularly when the problem could have been resolved below"); Trayner v.
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984) (issues not presented to the trial
court for decision are not reviewable on appeal). Therefore, we do not
consider the trial court's failure to make the requisite rule 52(a) statement of
the grounds for its decision on appeal.
id. at 204. As the appellate courts indicate, this matter (and other matters) not raised at
the trial court level will not be considered by the appellate court. Because Metropolitan did
not appropriately raise this issue at the trial court, it cannot now be considered on appeal.
Accordingly, the trial court's order should be affirmed on this separate basis also.
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In its brief, Metropolitan refers to its filing of a "Request for Clarification on Ruling
on Summary Judgment". In this request for clarification, Metropolitan states:
It was not clear to Metropolitan if the court's ruling expressly contemplated
the 'regular use' exclusion issue raised by the parties. Metropolitan therefore
requests a clarification from the court regarding whether or not the issue was
intended to be resolved by the court's order on the motions. If it was
resolved by the court, as argued by State Farm. Metropolitan would not have
any objection to State Farm's proposed order. However, if it was not within
the contemplation of the court in granting State Farm's motion, the proposed
order would need to be amended.
(R. 517-19.) Nevertheless, Metropolitan agreed with the proposed order as prepared by
State Farm, (if the issue of regular use was resolved).
Metropolitan's claim that it was "not clear" to Metropolitan if the court's ruling
covered the "regular use" exclusion is disingenuous. State Farm pointed this out in its
"Opposition to Metropolitan's Request for Clarification on Summary Judgment.":
(R. 526-529).
As this court is well aware, this court ruled on all issues before it at the
hearing of State Farm's and Metropolitan's motions for summary judgment.
In fact, the court expressly stated, among other things, that it granted State
Farm's motion for summary judgment, and denied Metropolitan's motion for
summary judgment, for the reasons set forth in State Farm's memorandum.
Moreover, the court expressly instructed counsel for State Farm to be put in
the order that it was based upon the reasons set forth in State Farm's
memorandum.
Among other things, the regular use exclusion was expressly dealt with not
only in the memorandum, but also at oral argument. Moreover, in granting
State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment, the court dealt with the regular
use exclusion issue. Among other things, State Farm pointed out both in its
memoranda and its argument that this exclusion is directly contrary to Utah
statute, and that Utah statute governs and requires coverage. Further, the
Metropolitan policy itself states that Utah law governs over its own
provisions. Moreover, State Farm pointed out that Barber v. Farmers Ins.
Exchange. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah 1988) is directly on-point and governs the
issue, and requires a finding of not only coverage, but that the regular use
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exclusion does not exclude coverage. In addition, State Farm pointed out,
among other things, that the Utah case Finlaysan. 751 P.2d 256 already
dealt with this exact provision in the Metropolitan policy and found that this
provision is ambiguous, and therefore did not exclude coverage. State Farm
also pointed out in its memorandum that even if the exclusion was not
contrary to statute, and even if it was not ambiguous, the subject vehicle was
not available for Thor Wixom's regular use.
In any event, this court has already ruled on all coverage issues (in this
defendant's favor). In fact, counsel for Metropolitan, at the end of the
hearing on these motions, requested that the court enter final judgment
pursuant to Rule 54b, recognizing that the court's ruling was dispositive of
all coverage issues. Metropolitan's position now is directly inconsistent with
its prior recognition at the hearing that the court had ruled on all issues.
Metropolitan's request appears to merely be an attempt to re-argue its
position.
(R. 527-28).
As it relates to the oral argument in particular, the "regular use" exclusionary
language was specifically referred to by both counsel for State Farm and counsel for
Metropolitan. (See e.g. Transcript on Appeal, pp. 28-29, attached to Appellant's Brief as
Addendum " 1 " where Metropolitan states that "the regular use exclusion was not
addressed by the parties at the hearing.) This is clearly false as a review of the hearing
transcript clearly shows. (See e.g. Transcript on Appeal, pp. 28-29, attached to Appellant's
Brief as Addendum "1".))
In any event, the Metropolitan's request for clarification was not an objection to the
form of the order. Further, Metropolitan agreed that the form of the Order was appropriate
(if the regular use issue had been addressed). It is clear the "regular use" issue was
addressed. Moreover, Metropolitan did not take steps to bring its motion for clarification
before the court to obtain a ruling on such, and thereby waived any right to appeal that
request.
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For the above reasons, Metropolitan has waived any right to challenge the wording
of the Order on appeal.
As a separate basis of waiver, Metropolitan also failed to raise this issue in its
docketing statement. Under the section entitled, "Issues Presented by the Appeal", in the
docketing statement, Metropolitan lists four issues. None of the four issues listed is
whether the trial judge committed reversible error by failing to issue a brief statement on
the grounds for its decision. Thus, Metropolitan has waived any right to appeal this issue
on this separate basis.
9.

THE ORDER SIGNED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS OTHERWISE
APPROPRIATE.

Even if Metropolitan has not waived its right to challenge the wording of the trial
court's order, (which it has), the order is otherwise appropriate.
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure indicates that: "The court shall,
however, issue a brief written statement of the grounds for its decision on all motions
granted under Rule 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based upon more
than one ground." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Here, the trial court complied with this rule.
During the hearing, the trial court indicated that it granted State Farm's motion for
summary judgment and denied Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment based upon
all of the arguments made by State Farm, and that such language was to be placed in the
Order. The Order does not merely state that the trial court granted State Farm's motion
and denied Metropolitan's motion. The order states that: "State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment against Metropolitan is hereby
granted for the reasons set forth in State Farm's Memorandum In Support of State Farm's
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Motion for Summary Judgment against Metropolitan and Reply Memorandum in Support
of State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment against Metropolitan."
(Emphasis added.)

(R. 523-24.)

The order goes on to state: [a]mong other things, in granting

Defendant State Farm's motion for summary against Metropolitan, this court declares that
the Metropolitan policy provides coverage for Thor Wixom as it relates to this matter, and
that the uninsured motorist provisions of the subject State Farm policy are not applicable
based upon the fact that the Metropolitan policy provides coverage." (R. 524.) The order
further states: "Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment is hereby denied based upon
the reasons set forth in State Farm's Memorandum in Opposition to Metropolitan's Motion
for Summary Judgment." (R. 524.) Thus, the court did provide a written statement of the
grounds for its order.
Further, even if the trial court had not provided the grounds for its order, there is still
no basis for reversal. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court states such in the case Metropolitan,
ironically, cites in its brief. See e.g. Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co.. 839 P.2d
798 (Utah 1992). While Metropolitan cited a portion of Allen in its brief, it stopped at the
point where the court went on to indicate what the rule actually was relating thereto. After
the language cited by Metropolitan, the court went on to state:
Be that as it may, some trial judges cling to the view that the less explanation
given for their rulings the better. They would prefer to remain silent and rely
on the presumption that their rulings are correct. As we have noted, the
wisdom of that view is questionable, but a trial judge's failure to comply with
the last sentence of rule 52(a) alone is not reversible error absent unusual
circumstances. See Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah
1991). We find no need to discuss in the abstract what may constitute
unusual circumstances, but note that they are not present here.
i d at 800-801. In Allen, the court had granted Prudential's motion for summary judgment
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for the reasons "set forth in the arguments of defendant." Jd. At 800. Thus the Utah
Supreme Court found that under those circumstances, it was not reversible error and did
not constitute unusual circumstances; therefore, according to Allen, there is no basis for
reversing the trial court's order.
Accordingly, on this separate basis, the trial court's order should be affirmed. (Note,
even if the trial court's order was inappropriate, and appellant had appropriately filed a Rule
52(b) motion requesting amendment, according to Utah law reversal is still inappropriate.
Rather, the court would merely remand it to the trial court). However, based upon the
arguments set forth above, such is be unnecessary and inappropriate under the
circumstances.
CONCLUSION
State Farm has set forth a number of bases, each of which supports the
affirmance of the trial court's order. State Farm requests that this court affirm the trial
court's order based upon the reasons set forth in this brief.
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